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SECURITY AND RIGHTS
Trevor C.W. Farrow*
This article explores various approaches
to the re-constitution of human rights
following 11 September 2001. In contrast
to the approaches advocated by Sean
McMahon and John Edwards, the author
proposes a re-commitment to the core
values embodied in the rights enshrined in
documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The article
proposes that re-constituting human
rights, either by a process of
consequentialist trade-offs or choice-
based prioritization, opens the door to
naturalizing infringements of rights in the
name of fear or security. Both detract
from the goals set out in human rights
declarations. Even in a security-conscious
environment, discussions of rights must
recognize and take into account the
established and fundamental commitments
to universal human rights and freedoms.
Cet article explore les diverses approches
de la reconstitution des droits de l’homme
suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001.
Contrairement aux approches préconisées
par Sean McMahon et John Edwards,
l’auteur propose un nouvel engagement
envers les valeurs essentielles incluses
dans les droits garantis dans des
documents telle que la Déclaration sur les
droits de l’homme. L’article suggère que
la reconstitution des droits de l’homme,
soit au moyen d’un processus de
compromis conséquentialistes ou d’une
hiérarchisation fondée sur le choix,
ouvrirait la voie à une violation
naturalisée des droits au nom de la
crainte ou de la sécurité. Les deux
processus font oublier les objectifs
énoncés dans les déclarations sur les
droits de l’homme. Même dans un milieu
sensible à la sécurité, les discussions sur
les droits doivent tenir compte des
engagements établis et fondamentaux des
droits et libertés universels de la
personne.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no easy way to create a world where men and women can live
together… 1
A number of papers in this special issue contemplate the notion
that, in light of globalization, the events of 11 September 2001, and
resulting government responses, human rights are in need of re-
constitution. One version — a utility-based version — of this re-
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Sean McMahon, “We Are All Potential Terrorists Now: The Reconstitutive2
Effects of the Anti-terrorism Act and the Patriot Act” (2005) 10 Rev. of
Constitutional Studies 46.
 John Edwards, “Security, Asylum, and Rights: Are All Rights Equal?” (2005)3
10 Rev. of Constitutional Studies 73.  
 I do not purport fully to summarize or explain the arguments of either4
McMahon or Edwards in this article. For their full arguments and lines of
support, see McMahon, supra note 2 and Edwards, ibid.
 For a further discussion of our post-September 11 heightened sensibility of5
fear, see Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Citizen Participation and Peaceful Protest:
Let’s Not Forget APEC” in Patricia Hughes & Patrick A. Molinari, eds.,
Participatory Justice in a Global World: The New Rule of Law (Montreal: Les
Éditions Thémis, 2004) 205 [Farrow, “Citizen Participation and Peaceful
Protest”].
 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7.6
 GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948)7
71.
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constitution, represented by current post-September 11 Western anti-
terrorism legislative initiatives, sees modern rights as increasingly
subordinate to security measures. Sean McMahon, in an article
entitled “We Are All Potential Terrorists Now: The Reconstitutive
Effects of the Anti-terrorism Act and the Patriot Act,”  critically2
discusses two of these initiatives and their resulting impact on power
relations in society.
Another version of rights re-constitution — a priority-based
version — is that proposed by John Edwards in his article  “Security,
Asylum, and Rights: Are All Rights Equal?”  Edwards argues that3
we should focus our energies, at least for the time being, on a limited
number of higher priority rights in order to make better progress in
protecting those key rights in an era in which security, not rights,
trumps.4
In this article, I argue that both the utility and priority-based
approaches — each leading ultimately to a limiting of rights — are
misguided. In my view, at a time of increased government security
initiatives resulting from heightened sensibilities of individual and
collective fear,  now, more than ever, we need to stay committed to5
the aspirational model of human rights that was established post-
1945 in, for example, the Charter of the United Nations  and the6
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Specifically, I make the7
simple but important point that by re-constituting human rights,
96 Security and Rights
 Charter of the United Nations, supra note 6, preamble.8
 In Canada, see e.g. Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41, and Criminal Code,9
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 2, 83.01-83.33. In the U.K., see e.g. Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 (U.K.), 2001, c. 24. In the U.S., see e.g. Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [Patriot Act].
 See John S. Mill, “On Liberty (1859)” in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On10
Liberty, Essay on Bentham , ed. by Mary Warnock (New York: New American
Library, 1974) 126 at 135. Sean McMahon points to Mill to establish the
“liberal problem of properly locating the threshold between individual liberty
and larger social considerations” (McMahon, supra note 2 at 49).
 I do not purport here to document the various reports and commentaries —11
positive and negative — looking at the trade-offs that have occurred in the
area of human rights in light of post-September 11 legislative initiatives. For
brief discussions, see Edwards, supra note 3 at 84-87, and McMahon, supra
note 2 at 55-65. For general commentary on the initiatives themselves, see
Yonah Alexander & Edgar H. Brenner, eds., The United Kingdom’s Legal
Responses to Terrorism  (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003);
Norman Abrams, Anti-Terrorism and Criminal Enforcement (St. Paul, MN:
West Group, 2003); and, Donald J. Musch, Balancing Civil Rights and
Security: American Judicial Responses Since 9/11 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana
Publications Inc., 2003). For a further discussion of the foreign and domestic
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either through a process of consequentialist trade-offs or choice-
based prioritization, we open the door to naturalizing infringements
on rights, made in the name of fear and security, that push us further
back, not further along, the path toward reaching the goals set out in
those post-1945 documents designed to “reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights” and promote “social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom … of all peoples.”  Ultimately,8
what is needed is not a re-constitution of rights, but rather a re-
commitment to the core values embodied in those rights.
II. RE-CONSTITUTING HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Utility-Based Re-Constitution
Two versions of rights re-constitution are discussed in this special
issue. One version, under post-September 11 Western anti-terrorism
legislative initiatives,  provides that the balance between security and9
freedom must be shifted — away from Mill’s preferred vision of
minimal liberty impairment  — in order  to better protect us from10
current and future terrorist threats.  The calculus made here is based11
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responses of the U.S. following the attacks of September 11, see “Responding
to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War” Note (2002) 115 Harvard Law
Rev. 1217 at 1221-1224. For a more general discussion assessing the
aftermath of September 11, see R. Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of
September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not” (2002) 117 Political
Science Quarterly 37.
For a general background discussion on utilitarianism and rights, see David12
Lyons, “Utility and Rights” in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 110.
 See McMahon, supra note 2 at 55-65. 13
 In my view, this argument obtains notwithstanding the following balancing14
language contained in Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act: “the Parliament of
Canada, recognizing that terrorism is a matter of national concern that affects
the security of the nation, is committed to taking comprehensive measures to
protect Canadians against terrorist activity while continuing to respect and
promote the values reflected in, and the rights and freedoms guaranteed by, the
. . . Charter”(Anti-terrorism Act, supra note 9, preamble). See also
Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248,
2004 SCC 42 at paras. 5-8, Iacobucci & Arbour JJ.
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,15
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[Charter].
 Discussed also by Edwards, supra note 3 at 84-85.16
 Supra note 9.17
 Shawn McCarthy, “The War on Terror: Anne McLellan’s New Ideals” The18
Globe and Mail (22 October 2001) A7. Shifting the balance under s. 1 of the
Charter allows for McLellan’s companion view that Canada’s anti-terror
legislation “fully complies with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (“Anti
2005
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on a consequentialist determination that puts a higher utility value on
protecting the security of the majority from threats of terrorism than
on the rights of the minority that are potentially infringed because of
that utility calculus.  12
Under this version, rights are purportedly re-constituted, not
directly, but rather indirectly through their infringement by security
initiatives  put in place, ironically, in the name of protecting those13
rights.  In Canada, this security-based utility approach manifests14
itself in a willingness to allow increased limits on well-established
Charter  rights in the name of security.  For example, during an15 16
October 2001 interview, Anne McLellan — Canada’s deputy prime
minister and then minister of justice under whom Canada’s Anti-
terrorism Act  was drafted — stated that the notion of “reasonable17
limit” in section 1 of the Charter has shifted since September 11.18
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Terrorism Law Complies with the Charter of Rights, McLellan Says” Toronto
Star (17 October 2001), cited in Kent Roach, “The Dangers of a Charter-Proof
and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism” in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick
Macklem & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s
Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 131 at 133).
This view also appears to be supported by a recent majority holding of the
Supreme Court of Canada that “terrorism necessarily changes the context in
which the rule of law must operate” (Application under s. 83.28 of the
Criminal Code (Re), supra note 14 at para. 6, Iacobucci & Arbour JJ).
 Edwards, supra note 3 at 78. Edwards further argues that this consequentialist,19
security-based approach poses a potentially “insidious” threat to rights  (ibid.
at 84).
 McMahon, supra note 2 at 50.20
 Supra note 9.21
 Ibid.22
 McMahon, supra note 2 at 52-53.23
 Ibid. at 54.24
 Ibid. at 68.25
 Ibid.at 54.26
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This limit — seen practically as the “inroads that security measures
make on rights” — is likely to result in an overriding of some rights19
as a result of “a new balance between individual liberties and the
security concerns of society.”20
This first view of rights is discussed, critically, by Sean
McMahon. He takes the view that post-September 11 security
initiatives — specifically the Anti-terrorism Act  and the Patriot21
Act  — negatively re-create societal power relations. McMahon22
develops this argument in several steps. First, using Bentham’s idea
of a panopticon (the “perfect prison”),  as  re-conceived by23
Foucault, McMahon argues that post-September 11 security
initiatives re-make us as self-disciplining members of society.
Second, through this self-disciplining process, control by these
initiatives “is continuous and automatic.”  Third, the process is24
preventative. According to McMahon, prevention “strives to stop an
act or omission before it is committed”; it “strives to pre-empt,” and
the “most effective and efficient form of pre-emption is self-
discipline on the part of the objects of surveillance.”  Fourth,25
because of the “prevalence of power” in this panopticon-view of
modern society, the exercise of actual power is made “obsolete.”26
Finally, again using a Foucauldian argument, the result of this
panopticonism spreads “throughout the social body, thereby
Trevor C.W. Farrow 99
 Ibid.27
 Ibid. at 65.28
 Ibid. at 69.29
 Ibid.30
 Ibid. at 72.31
 Ibid.32
 Edwards, supra note 3 at 85.33
 McMahon, supra note 2 at 72.34
 Ibid.35
 Ibid. McMahon’s article sparks a further point about this utility-based version36
of rights re-constitution that should also be mentioned.  Legislation in place
prior to the passing of these initiatives was likely adequate to deal with the
potential security threats at issue (ibid. at 55-58). The initiatives should
therefore “not be read as legislative discontinuities” or “original . . . attempts
to address the issue of terrorism.” Rather, they should be “recognized as
continuations of the persistent state practice of penetrating the body politic
deeper and more completely with surveillance” (ibid. at 55). As such, it may
2005
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constituting the disciplinary society.”  What we are left with,27
according to McMahon, is a re-made citizen-subject living in a
disciplinary society that is individualized and totalized –  i.e., under
legislation that “encompasses the whole of the social body and
applies to every individual member constituting the body.”   28
McMahon identifies four concerns with this post-September 11
utility-based rights discussion. First, the “particular subjectivity”
characterizing this “newly reconstituted self-disciplining” society is
one that sees us all as “potential terrorists.”  Second, it is a29
subjectivity that “subordinates considerations of justice to the
maintenance of extant power relations.”  Third, related to the second30
point, this subjectivity allows for a “rejection of normative concerns”
in the context of human rights protections.  Fourth, it also “highly31
circumscribe[s]” our range of possible options for political dissent.32
A fifth concern, raised by Edwards, is that the damage caused by this
erosion of rights is “largely unquantifiable.”33
The implications of this utility-based rights discussion, viewed
through McMahon’s lens of citizen rights-holders as re-made
subjects, are “ominous.”  For McMahon, only when citizens34
“recognize that they are all the potentially guilty objects of these acts
of governing,” and not simply “the Other,” will “this new
subjectivity . . . be challenged.”  And for McMahon, “challenged it35
must be.”   36
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be that concerns with these new initiatives, in the context of rights re-
constitution, could have been avoided (or limited) by relying on previous
initiatives that were in place to deal with threats that would include current
threats of terrorism.
See Farrow, “Citizen Participation and Peaceful Protest,” supra note 5. See37
also Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Law & Politics after September 11th: Civil Rights
& the Rule of Law” (2003) 35 Hosei Riron J. of Law & Politics 163; and,
Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Terrorism, Law & Democracy: A Review Essay” 36:1
Ottawa Law Rev. (forthcoming).
 Edwards, supra note 3 at 75.38
 Ibid.39
 Ibid. at89-90. Edwards spends only a short time on this exercise; see ibid. at40
89-92.
 Ibid. at 89.41
 Ibid. at 80.42
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I have discussed elsewhere a number of related concerns about the
negative impact that post-September 11 legislative initiatives
potentially have on rights.  I do not develop those arguments further37
here. For purposes of this article, I echo McMahon’s concerns.
B. Priority-Based Re-Constitution
A second version of rights re-constitution is that proposed by
John Edwards. For Edwards, what is needed is a re-conception of
“the standing of rights, their moral content, their authority, indivisi-
bility, and their tradeability.”  This would amount to a “less didactic,38
more morally foundational approach to an understanding of rights.”39
As such, we should “identify some rights as more important than
others,” a process that would be facilitated by a “foundational view
of rights” that explains “why we have the rights we do.”  By40
concentrating “our efforts” on those rights, we “might make more
progress in fulfilling and protecting them.”41
Edwards’ argument is motivated by his underlying view that
international human rights, discussed primarily using the example of
asylum seekers,  are not being adequately protected under current42
rights regimes. This lack of protection is, for Edwards, based on four
factors. First, we now live in a very different world than the post-
1945 world in which current international human rights regimes were
primarily promulgated. Unlike that world, today’s world is a far less
“static place” in which “the obscenities of state actions” are “no
longer the main kind[s] of threat to human dignity and autonomy …
Trevor C.W. Farrow 101
 Ibid. at 74-75.43
 Ibid. at 84.44
 Ibid. 45
 Ibid.46
 Ibid. at 74. See also ibid. at 83-84, where Edwards similarly argues that “the47
‘Rock of Rights’ — the universality, indivisibility, and equality of all rights
is an orthodoxy that may well not best serve the interests of those whose rights
are threatened.”
 Ibid. at 88-90.48
 Ibid. 49
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[T]he pattern of human rights abuses today is of a different kind to
those of the post-Second World War era.”   43
Second, because of this modern shift in the locus of threat and
abuse, different kinds of security measures are now being instituted.
As Edwards comments, “[t]here has been an explosion in the security
industry over the past ten years and this has been nowhere more
noticeable than in the West.”  Further, “[l]imitations on police44
activity are frequently suspended in the interests of security; security
can override most other considerations.”  The result of these new45
initiatives: “[i]t is security, not rights that now trump[s].”46
Third, current international human rights regimes operate as all-
or-nothing protections. There is little flexibility in their creation or
application. Therefore, for Edwards, treating rights as “imperative,”
“indivisible,” “unmovable” and “non-derogable” — as a “Rock of
Rights” — has proven “to be one of its main limitations.”47
Fourth, confusion and omissions result from distinctions currently
made between both human and citizen rights and international and
state action. As Edwards explains, states “are . . . better at righting
wrongs within their boundaries”; “can be more flexible in their
correlative action”; within their boundaries “citizen rights are less
generous or just do not apply to non-citizens”; and “are much less
likely than international courts and councils to take a considered
view of the rights they are damaging or to consider their impact.”48
As a result, “the possibility of rights existing as ‘global’ declaratory
rights and simultaneously as citizen rights with closely overlapping
content but different duty-holders, can be a recipe for confusion and
an opportunity for dissimulation and inaction.”49
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 Ibid. at 84.50
 I am grateful to Annalise E. Acorn for comments on the development of these51
arguments.
 Edwards, supra note 3 at 89.52
 Ibid. at 91-92.53
 Ibid. at 75.54
 Ibid. at 84.55
 Ibid.56
 In the context of security initiatives, see e.g. Application under s. 83.28 of the57
Criminal Code (Re), supra note 14. In the U.S., see e.g. Hamdi et al. v.
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense et al., 542 U.S. 507 (2004), No. 03-6696 (28
June 2004), online:  Supreme Court of the United States <http://a257.g.akam
a i t e c h . n e t / 7 / 2 5 7 / 2 4 2 2 / 2 8 j u n e 2 0 0 4 1 2 1 5 / w w w . s u p r e m e c o u r t u s .
gov/opinions/03pdf/03-6696.pdf>.
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These four concerns raised by Edwards are important to our
understanding of current rights protection and reform. The potential
for progress to which he also points, under his version of rights re-
constitution, is appealing. It is also, however, misguided, ultimately
resulting in a disservice to his stated project of “serv[ing] the
interests of those whose rights are threatened.”   50
I suggest that Edwards’ argument is misguided for three reasons.51
The first deals with his allowance for prioritizing between “more
important” and “lower priority” rights.  To help facilitate this52
choice, Edwards makes several distinctions between types of rights:
citizen and human; declaratory and foundational; and more and less
“essential” (for our “existence as morally autonomous agents”). He
also distinguishes between the objects of rights as “means to ends”
(such as “education, social security, the right to work, the right to
leisure and so on”) and “ends in themselves” (“liberty, freedom of
movement, worship, [and] thought”).  Notwithstanding these53
distinctions, it is unclear exactly what Edwards is ultimately
contemplating in this prioritization as rights re-constitution. Given
his discussion of globalization,  modern security regimes  and54 55
security trumping rights,  he appears to be considering some kind of56
balancing of rights. If this is correct — if he is considering some kind
of balance, similar to what Canadian courts already do under section
1 of the Charter  — then we have really advanced no further than57
the version of rights re-constitution contemplated by the utility-based
version discussed by McMahon.
If what he means involves the more fundamental issue of
Trevor C.W. Farrow 103
One only needs to look as far as John Rawls’ project of establishing58
fundamental principles of justice, and the resulting criticisms of that project,
as one example of that difficulty.  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev.
ed. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999),
and John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001) [Rawls, Justice as
Fairness]. For criticisms, see e.g. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits
of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Michael J. Sandel,
“Morality and the Liberal Ideal” New Republic 190 (7 May 1984) 15; and,
Michael J. Sandel, “Political Liberalism” Book Review of Political Liberalism
by John Rawls (1994) 107 Harvard Law Rev. 1765.
 See Edwards, supra note 3 at 87-93.59
 Ibid. at 93.60
 Ibid.61
 Ibid.62
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identifying what rights are necessary for moral autonomy, then it
seems to me that he runs into two further problems. The first is that
this calculus is really beside the point in the context of how to
balance security and rights. Even if we were able to identify a core
set of fundamental human rights, and further, if we were willing to
say that those rights were more important than (and would trump) a
competing right –  for example, to be protected from imminent death
resulting from a terrorist attack – then we are still going to be left
with a balancing of rights and security contemplated under the
utility-based version.  
The related problem is one of realizability. If we were able to
agree fairly on what rights — or what principles of fundamental
justice, for that matter — are necessary for moral autonomy, then
Edwards’ argument might be quite useful. However, such choices
are, quite frankly, not easy to make.  This problem is not fatal in58
itself. However, while Edwards gives us some ideas,  he does not59
ultimately provide us with any real assistance in this calculus. He
acknowledges that “[u]ntil we have a clearer view of exactly what is
and is not required for moral autonomy, however, we can make little
progress with prioritizing rights.”  Thus, even with his means/ends60
distinction — under which he argues “there is more reason to be
optimistic”  — Edwards recognizes that we still will “need a61
principled set of criteria to judge relevance to moral autonomy and
what constitute means/ends rights.”  He concludes that the62
combination of the moral autonomy and means/ends sets of ideas
104 Security and Rights
 Ibid.63
 Ibid. at 89. I do not argue that a zero-sum environment must (or in fact should)64
obtain. However, given Edwards’ acknowledgment, it is clear that his present
argument contemplates such an environment.
 Ibid.65
 In Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), Ronald Dworkin66
provides a modern view of this concern in his statement that “utilitarian
arguments . . . are ruled out by the concept of rights” (at 203).
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“ought to provide the means for prioritizing rights.”  He may well63
be right. However, again, he does not provide us with anything
further on how, as a practical matter,  prioritization takes place. So
we are left with the direction to prioritize, without any real guidance
as to how to do so.
My second criticism of Edwards’ project is quite simple. By
choosing some rights over others in what appears to be, for Edwards,
a zero sum environment, some rights will always be left behind.
Edwards himself acknowledges that the “price” for this choice is
that “some ‘lower priority’ rights would remain unfulfilled for the
time being.”  This goes back to the first problem of having to choose64
which rights will be left behind. It also creates the further problem of
sanctioning a system that is necessarily designed to fail in some cases
without really telling us what those cases are or how the choices will
be made. Again, we seem to be no further ahead than we are under
the utility-based version.
My third objection is more fundamental. By allowing for the
possibility of prioritizing rights (prior to any discussion of balancing
under competing notions of security), even if only “for the time
being,”  we open the door to consequentialist arguments of utility65
that will ultimately, it is feared, lead to majority-dominated priority
calculations. And it is against unfair determinations and
prioritizations by majorities under these calculations that
fundamental rights regimes — like the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Canada’s Charter — are designed to protect.66
As Ronald Dworkin states,
[t]he bulk of the law — that part which defines and implements social,
economic, and foreign policy — cannot be neutral. It must state, in its
greatest part, the majority’s view of the common good. The institution of
rights is therefore crucial, because it represents the majority’s promise to
the minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected. When the
Trevor C.W. Farrow 105
Ibid. at 205. See also Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps” in Waldron, ed.,67
supra note 12, 153.
 Edwards, supra note 3 at 89.68
 Plato, “Apology”  in J.D. Kaplan, ed., Dialogues of Plato (New York:69
Cardinal, 1952) 4 at 24.
 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 58 at 1, 4.70
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divisions among the groups are most violent, then this gesture, if law is to
work, must be most sincere.67
Under Edwards’ prioritization argument, we are left with little
guidance as to how to choose between competing rights when
making determinations about which rights should be left behind.
And without a principled priority-based theory, we are left
vulnerable to the will of the majority, even before we get to any
balancing calculations under utility-based security regimes.
III. RE-COMMITTING TO HUMAN RIGHTS
It seems to me that neither the utility-based nor the priority-based
rights discussion provides any kind of meaningful change to our
current understanding of the nature of rights. As such, what we are
really talking about here is not a re-constitution of rights, but rather
a need to re-commit to the core values of existing and future human
rights regimes.
By arguing for either a utility-based or a priority-based
understanding of rights (the latter, as Edwards acknowledges,
amounts to “heresy in many human rights circles”),  we are68
resigning ourselves, in either case, to less effective regimes than the
aspirations to which we agreed in our post-1945 rights-based
documents. Yet, the aspirational nature of those documents is their
strength, particularly at a time when rights are under severe strain as
a result of modern security concerns. As early as Socrates’ defence
in his trial in the Apology (of himself and the just life) — “O men of
Athens, I say to you . . . either acquit me or not; but whichever you
do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to
die many times”  — aspirational approaches to justice have been69
advocated. More recently, John Rawls identified that, as one of the
“roles that political philosophy may have as part of a society’s public
political culture,” political philosophy holds out a “realistically
utopian” ideal, thus “probing the limits of practicable political
possibility.”   70
106 Security and Rights
 See Edwards, supra note 3 at 87.71
 (1994) 1-1 I.H.R.R. 240, cited in D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on72
International Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at 627.
 Edwards, supra note 3 at 84.73
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Setting high goals pushes us in a direction designed to better the
human condition for all, not to settle for a middle ground that
necessarily pays the heavy price of leaving some behind (particularly
without a principled basis for doing so). While Edwards is looking
to make some positive inroads into bettering “the overall welfare and
security of rights-holders,” particularly in the context of asylum
seekers who he sees as falling through the cracks of our current all-
or-nothing system,  his priority-based argument, in my view,71
threatens the goal of universal human rights regimes, a goal that
takes all rights and their universality seriously. As the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights 1993,
adopted by the Vienna World Conference, provides: 
1. The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the
solemn commitment of all States to fulfill their obligations to
promote universal respect for, and observance and protection
of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . The
universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond
question. . . . 
5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated. The international community
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the
significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.72
Edwards is right that we are clearly not there yet. And he,
supported by McMahon’s discussion, is also right that currently,
under modern security regimes, “[i]t is security, not rights, that now
trump[s].”  But that cannot be our endgame; it is certainly not the73
endgame of our post-1945 human rights regimes. We can and must
do better than that. It is for this reason that I am so concerned about
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any discussion of rights that allows, as part of its purpose, for the
necessary erosion or neglecting of some rights.
Some argue that globalization is, at least in part, responsible for
increased pressures on human rights.  As I have argued elsewhere,74 75
globalization means many things to many people. Of its varied
potential aspects, Edwards correctly identifies several central
components that may be relevant to human rights considerations,
including: “increases in intra- and inter-national movements of
population for purposes of work, tourism, [and] flight from
oppression or war”; the “spread of ideas, cultural artifacts and
ideologies with a heightened potential for conflict”; and, “increased
contact between ideological and other interest groups such as
independence, religious, and political groups, not all of whom will
use pacifist ways of promoting their cause.”  Fundamental to each76
of these elements is the movement of humans and  ideas. With this
increase in movement comes an increase in potential conflict. And
with this increase in potential conflict comes a need for increased
human rights protections. Utility-based arguments make no apology
for overriding some rights in favour of others. Edwards’ priority-
based solution favours some rights over others, necessarily leaving
the latter unprotected.
In my view, any discussion of rights needs to take seriously, as a
starting point, all rights of all people. This is what we have agreed
to in documents like the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action on Human Rights 1993.  The price of leaving some rights77
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behind, by design, may simply be too high, particularly without a
more principled basis for how to make that calculation.  
From this starting point, a discussion of the re-constitution of
rights would begin with the acknowledgment that the problem lies
not in our understanding of rights, but rather in our ability to, or
choice not to, protect those rights. Elements of that discussion would
include a commitment, or re-commitment, to the aspirational nature
of the post-1945 rights project already in place. However,
notwithstanding this commitment, there are clearly going to be
challenges and difficult choices to be made between competing
rights and interests.  
It is for this reason that any discussion of rights needs to
emphasize the fundamental need for meaningful civil societies  and78
adequate room for robust political discussion and debate.  Equally79
important is a strong judiciary, empowered to protect the rule of law
(that contemplates both domestic and international human rights
commitments), particularly when majority rule in times of insecurity
threatens the rights of minority groups in society.  Further, while80
globalization puts pressure on rights, it also opens new avenues for
awareness, learning and monitoring — through advances in
technology and broad, cross-border discussion and international
scrutiny — that need to be harnessed for the further advancement
and protection of rights.  Finally, to the extent that current security81
concerns place strains on the goals of universal human rights
regimes, we need to realize, as Michael Ignatieff has argued, that
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human rights are “the best guarantor of national security.”  In the82
specific context of world insecurity as a result of inequality and
terrorism, we need to look behind the anger in order to start to
understand and address its sources. Here, again, respect for universal
human rights and needs is fundamental.
IV. CONCLUSION
King’s comment quoted at the outset of this article about the
difficulty of creating racial harmony in the 1960s is equally apposite
to the difficulty of establishing international civil and political
harmony today. Current terrorism is real and in need of prevention
and response. One only need look at the recent bombings in London,
occuring during the start of the July 2005 G8 Summit in Scotland,
to bring home this harsh reality.  As such, as a majority of the83
Supreme Court of Canada recently stated: “The challenge for
democracies in the battle against terrorism is not whether to respond,
but rather how to do so.”   84
I agree. However, whatever measures are put in place to protect
us from current threats must be crafted in such a way that they do not
destroy the very rights and freedoms they are designed to protect.85
And in this security-conscious environment, any discussion of rights
— utility-based, priority-based, or other — must accord with our
well-established fundamental commitments to universal human
rights and freedoms.
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Canadian Ronald St. John MacDonald, the first non-European
judge on the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg,
recently stated that “[w]e need to promote the idea that law is
liberating instead of constraining”; that it “makes possible the kind
of society we want to live in.”  Human rights regimes —86
international and domestic — need to be directed at the kind of
society we want to live in, not at the kind of society that only some
people can live in. Regardless of current security threats, discussions
of rights need to take this view seriously. Otherwise, in the fight to
protect democracies in the war against terror, we could become our
own worst enemy.
